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Promoting What We Oppose: Faith, the Free Market, and First Things
Abstract
Of increasing influence in the Australian Catholic Church is the kind of orthodoxy associated with American
conservatism in which the defence of life and family against the depredations of cultural liberalism is tied to
the defence of the free market and the promotion of economic liberalism. The clearest example of this
thinking being the magazine First Things, a magazine with great influence both in American and in Australia.
The argument of this paper is that there is an organic and determinative link between economy and culture
such that economic liberalism will inevitably give rise to, and promote, cultural liberalism. In short, that if the
Church identifies herself with the promotion of economic liberalism she will find herself promoting that
which she rightly opposes, namely what John Paul II referred to as the culture of death.
This article is available in Solidarity: The Journal of Catholic Social Thought and Secular Ethics: http://researchonline.nd.edu.au/
solidarity/vol3/iss1/1
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Promoting what we Oppose: Faith, the Free Market, and First Things 
Robert Tilley 
 
In 2008 as the Global Financial Crisis (the GFC as it has come popularly to be known) took 
hold there was what was seen to be a resurgence of interest in the Marxist critique of 
capitalism1, albeit by reference to capitalism’s more recent manifestations in neo-liberal 
thought and hyper-consumerism.2 As might be expected it was a rather truncated form of 
Marxist theory that enjoyed a new popularity, and although one could be pedantic as to 
whether or not Marx was being employed in a way that did justice to his thinking, 
nevertheless it was generally recognised that his writings had something important to say to 
the situation in which the world found itself.  
If there is one aspect to Marx’s thought that resonates with those looking for a critique of our 
modern global economy it is that to do with commodification, a process in which the value of 
everything becomes increasingly defined by way of market evaluation. Again, purists might 
quibble with the appropriation of Marx on this score, for missing from much of the discussion 
is the understanding that for Marx the process of commodification proper revolves around the 
abstraction of labour from the labourer in order to create surplus value for the employer. But 
that to one side it is certainly true that commodification became a central element in Marx’s 
thought for it related to the way in which all value and meaning (including the meaning and 
value of private property) had become transformed into what we would call market value. It 
is not too difficult to see why it was that this part of Marx’s thinking should have become 
popular, not least because with the GFC it seemed as if the lives of many had become 
worthless for, having lost their livelihood, their superannuation, even their houses and 
businesses, they had become expendable. People’s lives became little more than integers on 
the stock market board, the rise and fall of their personal value and meaning being 
commensurate with the rise and fall of the market. Succinctly put, everything was tied to the 
meaning of the markets. But what was lacking in many of the discussions on this matter was 
what was essential to Marxist thought, namely the relationship between the nature of the 
                                                          
1
 The meaning of the term ‘capitalism’ can differ according to the school one is listening to, but one element appears  
generally to be agreed upon, and this is the freeing up of capital such that it can become something that multiplies itself, 
which is to say that it is not bound to an objective, concrete locus of value. The issue in Marxist and other schools of 
economic philosophy is how self-fructifying capital relates to the wider society. In this essay I use terms as they are 
commonly used, especially in Institute for Religion and Public Life journal First Things (http://www.firstthings.com), so that 
‘free market’ theory becomes something of a synonym for capitalism. Some of us would question this identification and 
argue that capitalism is corrosive of truly free markets as it is of private property, the family, and things religious, but for the 
purposes of this article those objections have been put to one side. When I use the term ‘economic liberalism’ it refers to the 
way in which neo-liberal theory, capitalism, and the rolling back of government ‘interference’ in the market are all entwined. 
We will return to this matter of definition in the second part of this series.  
2
 As Tristram Hunt in his review of Terry Eagleton’s book Why Marx was Right (see below) in the Observer (29/5/11) put it, 
there has been a “growing appreciation for Marx’s predictions of globalisation, rampant capitalism, and the instability of 
international finance. As the Times put it in the middle of the 2008 crash: ‘He’s back’.” Eric Hobsbawm noted the same 
thing in his essay ‘Marx Today’ in his book How to Change the World: Tales of Marx and Marxism (London, Little, Brown, 
2011). Hobsbawm writes that it was, in fact, the Capitalists and not the Socialists who rediscovered Marx, and he cites by 
way of personal example the way in which United Airlines commissioned him to write a piece on the Communist Manifesto, 
and how George Soros no less requested instruction on Marx (5-6).  
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economy and the consciousness that could be said to define the culture in which that 
economy operates, a subject to which we will return. 
There is much that would need to be qualified in what has been said above, but I think it true 
to say that Marx or no Marx there has been a growth in many and varied quarters as to the 
problem of commodification and its effects on society, and this in respect of topics as wide 
ranging as the art world, the ecology (notably with anthropogenic climate change), the 
integrity of the local community, the privitisation of public utilities, the treatment of refugees, 
and most everything else in-between. The general sentiment has been that in certain matters 
Marx was right, that he had traced out the lineaments of the process of commodification and 
that in our day this process has reached something of its apogee.  
But what is significant about this line of argument is what is not mentioned. And what is not 
mentioned is something that one might have thought would prove the clinching argument in 
respect of the commodification of all areas of life; and this has to do with the subject of 
abortion and the concomitant use of embryonic and foetal stem cells for the hoped for 
development of health cures, as well as for industrial aids in the development of things like 
better flavour enhancers for soft-drinks.  
What’s more, abortion is defended on the lines of individual choice – hence the popular 
descriptor ‘pro-choice’ – and choice is of the essence of a consumer society especially in 
contemporary capitalism.3 Furthermore, the use of embryonic and foetal stem cells in health 
and industrial development to make better consumer products would seem to be the height of 
commodification, for human life itself is now very much a commodity (and a means to better 
commodities). If anything proved Marx right then it would seem abortion does, and yet 
abortion (and its accoutrements) is rarely if ever mentioned in treatments on Marxist theory in 
the last few decades. By way of example take the popular presentations of Marxist theory by 
Peter Singer and Terry Eagleton in which although they discuss commodification (it would 
be difficult not to) they do not mention abortion.4 
There is something of a blind spot here, which is to say an ideological ‘blank’ upon which, 
and around which, the popular discourse concerning Marxism revolves, both before the GFC 
and after. But here’s the thing, something similar attends more recent thinking in Christian 
                                                          
3
 It is possibly for this very reason that in January 2013 Planned Parenthood in America launched a YouTube video 
advertisement calling for the end of the use of labels such as ‘pro-choice’. See the discussion on the Atlantic magazine’s 
website in response to the article (January 23, 2013) ‘The End of Pro-Choice: Will ‘No Labels’ Really Help the Abortion 
Debate?’. See too Jeffrey Tobin ‘Daughters of Texas: the fight for abortion rights’ The New Yorker August 5, 2013). Tobin 
notes how it has been pointed out that Planned Parenthood is reticent in mentioning its provision of abortions. “In January 
[2013]” writes Tobin, “Planned Parenthood released a video in response to polling data that showed a distaste for labels – 
‘pro-choice’ or ‘pro-life’” (27). It is perhaps pertinent that in the reprint of Marshall McLuhan’s first major work, The 
Mechanical Bride: Folklore of Industrial Man (London, Duckworth Overlook, 2011, fp. 1951), McLuhan reproduces an 
advertisement for Sun Oil from 5/1/1948 that has the slogan: “There is only one freedom. Freedom of Choice’ (115).  
4
 Peter Singer Marx: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford, OUP, 1980. Singer doesn’t engage all that much with Marx on 
commodification, which I would have thought central to Marx’s argument, only a few short pages on how it relates to 
exchange value and alienation (67-71).  And Terry Eagleton Why Marx was Right, New Haven, Yale Uni. Pr., 2011. It might 
be objected that given the scope of these books it is unfair to expect anything like a thorough treatment of Marx and global 
capitalism as a consumer-market economy, however both books, and others like them, affect to be popular presentations in 
light of contemporary concerns. That is, they are setting out to show something of the relevance of Marx to the world in 
which the reader finds him or herself. I would think that how commodification had reached something of its apogee in 
abortion (and its accoutrements) might therefore be relevant to why Marx ‘was right’ and why it is his thinking is relevant to 
our world. 
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and notably Catholic circles that pride themselves on being orthodox and steadfastly pro-life, 
and it is this ‘blind spot’ that this paper wishes to explore.  
In August 2012, the McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence at Princeton, Robert George, was 
a key note speaker at the John Paul II Australian Leaders Forum in Sydney. His talk, entitled 
Five Pillars of a Decent and Dynamic Society, among other things argued that the family and 
the free-market go together. So much so that they are united not only in respect of matters 
moral but in respect of having a common enemy, to wit “hard left socialism,” the kind that is 
attended by an “entitlement mentality” and a “statist” ideology. George went so far as to say 
that against enemies like this “the market economy and the institution of marriage” will “in 
the end, stand or fall together.” The point being that Australian Catholicism, insofar as it 
considers itself as conservative and even orthodox, ought to follow the lead of her American 
cousins and see the defence of free-market capitalism as being of a piece with the defence of 
Catholic morality. Essential to this argument is the proposition that the economic and the 
cultural spheres of a society cannot be separated for they are in some form of causal or 
supervenient relationship; to change one is to change the other. 
So it was that early in his talk, George cited the American congressman and one time 
Republican Party nominee for Vice President, Paul Ryan, to the effect that “the notion of 
separating the social from the economic issues is a false choice” for “they stem from the same 
root.” As to what this root is (or was) George did not say, but what he did say in quoting 
Ryan was something that earlier forms of “hard left socialism” would have agreed with. 
Indeed, something fundamental to the critical analysis of Karl Marx. This is that the 
economic and the social are inextricably entwined such that there is a causal, even 
deterministic, relationship between the economy a people live within and the way in which 
their consciousness, we might say, is shaped. Different forms of economy give rise to, or are 
attended by, different forms of consciousness. 
What Marx (or for that matter Ryan and George) meant by consciousness is unclear, but then 
again it is a notoriously hard subject to pin down, for contrary to what many assume 
consciousness means more than simple awareness. But whatever else ‘consciousness’ might 
mean it has to do with the way in which we experience the world in which we live, how we 
conceive of ourselves and others, and do so in respect of value and thus meaning. For 
George, if the family and marriage are properly to be valued and then defended and nurtured, 
if they are to be protected from those enemies that would destroy them, if they are to be 
prevented from ‘falling’, then it is necessary to have a free-market economy. Under 
capitalism the family will thrive; under socialism it will decline - and presumably this is 
because under the former the family is valued and has meaning, while under the latter it is not 
valued and, as a consequence, it has little meaning.  
Robert George’s talk may be seen by some as of little moment in the history of Sydney 
Catholicism let alone Australian Catholic history. And it might be thought to have even less 
significance for the discussion on matters of the faith in respect of culture and politics. But 
with this I would disagree, for whatever one’s views on the merits, or lack thereof, of 
George’s talk the fact that he was a key note speaker at the Leaders Forum indicates 
3
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something very important indeed, not least for the way in which Australian Catholicism 
might understand its mission in the near future. Succinctly put, the tendency is to identify 
orthodox Catholicism with the championing of limited government and a concomitant 
commitment to the free-market. And to do this via certain currents in America associated 
with the magazine First Things (which in turn has a sympathetic and collegial relationship 
with the Heritage Foundation, one of the preeminent think tanks in America, and one that 
identifies itself with the cause for limited government and liberal economic theory). Robert 
George is regular contributor to First Things, writing on matters political, economic, juridical, 
and moral.5 George is also a regular contributor and participant in the Heritage Foundation’s 
programs and events indeed he is described on the Foundation’s website as being a non staff 
member. 
The tying together, even identifying, of liberal economic theory with conservative/orthodox 
Christianity is nothing new, for it can be argued that this was a process that came into its own 
in the mid twentieth century in evangelical Protestantism. Further, that the Catholic tendency 
to do the same began in earnest in the 1970s with the rise of the Moral Majority and an 
increasing willingness of Catholics to work alongside evangelical Protestants to counter the 
influence of cultural liberalism. This is not the place to rehearse the history of this 
phenomenon but instead to argue against its continuation, which is to say to argue against 
identifying orthodox Catholicism with the defence of liberal economics and free-market 
theory, and with the concomitant championing of limited government. And the reason for 
opposing this can be explained by reference to something hinted at in George’s talk, 
something touched upon above; that there is a strong causal relationship between 
consciousness and the dominant economics of a society. This relationship can be summed up 
in the following aphorism: cultural liberalism is the expression proper of economic 
liberalism. In other words, where you have economic liberalism you will have, if not of 
necessity then certainly in all likelihood, cultural liberalism. And the obverse holds as well: 
where you have cultural liberalism you will have economic liberalism. In order to explain 
why this is the case it will be necessary to rehearse something of the history of that which is 
essential to the rise and formation of capitalism proper, and thus to capitalism’s more modern 
expression in respect of neo-liberal policy vis a vis free-markets and consumerism, a history 
that is entwined with the topic of usury. A history, however, that will be discussed in the 
second part of this series. In this article we will be approaching our subject by way of 
                                                          
5
 Indeed George’s talk was pretty much an adaptation of an earlier article he penned for First Things in October 2008 
entitled ‘Making Business Moral’. There is one significant difference between the pieces, in ‘Making Business Moral’ he 
argues for three pillars for a good society, whereas there are two more in his later talk ‘Five Pillars of  decent and Dynamic 
Society’. In  a more recent essay, ‘Ruling to Serve’ (First Things, April 2013), Robert George argues, via John Finnis, that 
the best form of government is that which best accords with what enables human nature to flourish (“human flourishing”), 
and this, as might be expected, is “limited government.”. A theory of government based not on supplying the needs of the 
populace but of facilitating their finding these things themselves. It is a “facilitative conception” of government one that 
“clearly excludes corporatist and socialist policies.”. In order for the ‘facilitative’ conception of government to be realised 
then it must maintain a “market economy” (41). Later in his essay, George implicitly ties together the kind of economy a 
people live within and whether or not they will express or be led to express “virtue.” The point being made is that only a 
virtuous people can ensure that a limited government and market economy will thrive, but one also gets the impression that 
limited government and a market economy will be conducive to virtue especially as, George argues, such an economic and 
political arrangement best squares with the Catholic doctrine of subsidiarity (41). The problem being, however, that today 
virtue does not seem overly evident under the dominance of the market economy, a point that has prompted the discussion 
on liberalism and conservatism in the pages of First Things, of which more below. 
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reference to the magazine mentioned earlier, namely First Things. First Things is one of those 
magazines that is more than just a magazine for it represents a movement if not a force for 
cultural change, perhaps the only comparable magazine is Adbusters which not a few see as 
being the source of the Occupy Wall Street movement. 
First Things was founded and edited by Fr John Neuhaus and within Christian (not just 
Catholic) conservatism it is the most respected and the most sophisticated, not to mention the 
best written magazine on the market. It is an excellent read and is rarely boring or stultifying 
pious in the way some conservative religious periodicals can be (and which all liberal 
theological periodicals are). Its contributors are a who’s who of major writers today in the 
area of religious and social matters, and among their number is Australia’s Cardinal Pell. It 
might be compared to Commentary magazine, another American conservative journal, and 
the Australian secular magazine Quadrant (to which Cardinal Pell is also a sometime 
contributor), and though these are also well written and engaging, I do not think they have 
quite the same clout that First Things has. Fr Neuhaus died in January 2009 and new hands 
took over the reins. From at least 2011 First Things has been engaged in a period of what 
might be called a period of reassessment, at least insofar as its relationship to liberalism is 
involved. And this has occasioned not a few papers in the magazine on what liberalism is and 
whether or not it is wise to style oneself as a liberal. Of course, what is meant by liberalism 
has itself been a matter for discussion, and much of the debate has turned upon whether or not 
there is a liberalism that can properly be called Christian or, at the very least, be something 
which a Christian can feel comfortable with, of which more later. That First Things is at 
something of a crossroads is evident in the remarks recently made by its editor Russell 
Ronald Reno in his comments that served to open the symposium on this very matter.6 
First Things, writes Reno, was “associated with an optimistic phase of American 
conservatism. The Reagan coalition affirmed American exceptionialism, sought to unleash 
the creative potential of capitalism, and was influenced by a can-do, problem-solving 
neoconservatism.” “To a great extent secular liberals and religious believers of the First 
Things sort united to construct a global system under American leadership with capitalism as 
the engine of economic development and human rights as its moral basis.” The only problem, 
Reno notes, is that this was too successful. “Today, the success of global capitalism has 
encouraged a secular materialism all around the world. The definition of human rights is 
almost entirely controlled by secular elites who are antagonistic to the role and influence of 
religion in public life...” So what now? Well, now that “global capitalism, or at least market 
based economic thinking is triumphant” this reduces the need for First Things to “defend the 
market economy” even though that was “a clear priority in the past.”7 But if that is not the 
priority then what is? It was this question that the symposium was meant to address. 
It is important for us that we should note that the substance of Reno’s argument was that 
liberalism, capitalism and free-market theory are not the problem per se; rather the problem is 
that certain ‘elites’ have managed to gain enough power to skew these laudable things so as 
to have them serve bad ends. As we will see, this is something of the default position of First 
                                                          
6
 R. Reno ‘The Challenges we Face: A Symposium on the Future of First Things’ First Things, Aug./Sept. 2013. 
7
 Ibid p.34. 
5
Tilley: Promoting What We Oppose
Published by ResearchOnline@ND, 2013
6 
 
Things: that cultural liberalism has no real organic or causal relationship to economic 
liberalism, but is in fact something of an aberration. It is this ‘aberration’ that First Things has 
been attempting to explain, at least in the years since Fr Neuhaus’ death. 
What follows is not meant to be an exhaustive overview of the different positions argued for 
in the pages of First Things but I do think it is a fair presentation of the way in which the 
argument is going. The best place is to start with Fr John Neuhaus’ own work on the subject, 
one that was recently reissued by reason that it has been so important on the thinking and 
direction of First Things. This is his book Doing Well and Doing Good: The Challenge to the 
Christian Capitalist published in 1992.8 As First Things was founded shortly before this book 
was published, in 1990, it is not too difficult to see how the magazine was informed by the 
same ethos that informed its editor’s views adumbrated in his book. After all, Neuhaus would 
have been researching and writing the book at the same time he was giving birth to First 
Things. It does not seem unjust, then, to assume that both the book and the magazine arose 
sharing something of the same vision. 
Neuhaus’ book is something of a commentary upon and engagement with the then recently 
published encyclical of John Paul II Centesimus Annus, his argument being that this 
encyclical is something of a vindication of free-market capitalism insofar as Catholic social 
teaching is concerned9, and that it serves to balance the approach of former Popes not least 
that to be found in the writings of Paul VI.10 This is not the place to argue this point and some 
of us might find Neuhaus’ interpretations a bit skewed if not tendentious. But our interest 
here is in Neuhaus’ views irrespective of whether or not they coincide with the encyclical in 
question. 
Neuhaus is not blind to problems in the modern capitalist economy, only in his book these 
problems, especially the moral ones, notably those that have to do with the rise of abortion, 
appear unrelated to capitalism as capitalism and have more to do with relativism and a 
concomitant form of liberalism (even with Communism).11 Indeed, the problems that can be 
found within a capitalist and market economy should more properly be tied to dispositions 
such as greed, hence it is a problem with human nature (fallen as it is) rather than with the 
economic system. Furthermore, the problems attendant upon sins such as greed only become 
exacerbated when politics tries to change things by changing human nature, socialism being a 
prime example of this bloody folly.12 For its part, capitalism has never presented itself as a 
remedy for a world wounded by sin.13  
The point is that for Neuhaus there seems little problem with capitalism per se, except, that is, 
when the state involves itself in the free market. So it is that he opposes raising the basic 
wage, for this, he writes, is an ‘artificial’ remedy that will only destroy the employment 
prospects of those it claims to help.14 The state should not interfere in the market; especially 
                                                          
8
 J. Neuhaus Doing Well and Doing Good: The Challenge to the Christian Capitalist, New York, Image, 1992. 
9
 Ibid p.78. 
10
 67. 
11
 209-210.  
12
 27. 
13
 40. 
14
 225. 
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not if it is guided by the idea that it can eradicate exploitation by reining in capitalism, this is 
because ultimately the problems that might attend global capitalism have little if anything to 
do with exploitation, but rather with exclusion. If there is a problem with modern capitalism 
then it is that it is not as dominant and widespread as it ought to be. The answer to the 
problems of poverty and unemployment will be better answered when all are included in the 
global market for then there will be no more “marginalisation.”15 There will be no more 
marginalisation by reason that it is exactly this that capitalism destroys. Capitalism is about 
pluralism and thus inclusiveness in all spheres of human life. “Economic pluralism is 
connected to political pluralism is connected to cultural pluralism.”16 These are big claims, 
and one might be forgiven for thinking that, when all is said and done, Neuhaus seems to 
contradict himself for in his view capitalism not only does present itself as something of a 
remedy for human sin, but it delivers on its claim as well!17 
Perhaps such a claim should not surprise us, if, that is, we take Neuhaus’ opening premise to 
heart, for in the first pages of his book he asserts a proposition that would warm the heart of a 
classical Marxist, which is to say one who still held to the deterministic relationship between 
base and superstructure – that is, between economy and culture. “Our subject,” writes 
Neuhaus, “is economic freedom, but this book is about much more than economics. That is 
because economic behaviour is inseparably intertwined with other social spheres, notably the 
political and the cultural.” And, “at the heart of the sphere we call culture is the moral and the 
spiritual.”18 It is this understanding of the interconnectedness of the economic, the political, 
and the cultural (which includes the spiritual) that not only informs his book but, as might be 
expected for reasons touched upon above, his magazine First Things as well. 
As was noted earlier, since the death of Fr Neuhaus there has been much discussion in First 
Things as to the magazine’s relationship to cultural and economic liberalism, though this has 
in no way seriously brought into question its positive attitude to the free-market and the 
concomitant limited role of the state. The issue has instead been about the kind of liberalism 
with which First Things should identify itself. In this respect Wilfred McClay’s essay 
‘Liberalism after Liberalism’ is instructive.19 McClay contrasts two forms of liberalism. The 
first which is primarily defined in economic terms is one that holds to a “free-market 
economy” and limited government, as well as to “natural rights” which rights are tied to 
“upholding the independence and supreme value of the individual person as a free agent.” 
This liberalism is tolerant, it holds to “religious disestablishment” and, echoing Neuhaus’ 
book, is all for “pluralism.”20 
                                                          
15
 209. Thus, pace Paul VI, Neuhaus writes, the problems will not be solved by wealth distribution but by wealth creation 
(67). 
16
 264. 
17
 Indeed, we are even told that the capitalist system being identifiable with pluralism is thus the system most conducive to 
the truth being found for it is the system that allows the majority the freedom to “decide against the truth.” This is important 
for it means that truth can “contend more effectively another day” (271). 
18
 1-2 (see too 49). Elsewhere, as if by way of aside, Neuhaus appears to contradict this point when he writes of the “seeds of 
democratic capitalism’s distinctions between economy, culture, and politics” (67). Given that his book, taken as a whole, is a 
defence of capitalism by reason that its principles of pluralism and freedom (according to his assessment) informs politics 
and culture (which includes the spiritual realm as well), then this comment seems more than a little inconsistent.  
19
 Wilfred McClay ‘Liberalism after Liberalism’ First Things, May 2012. 
20
 Ibid p.26. 
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The second form of liberalism – called by McClay the ‘new liberalism’ – argues that a high 
degree of equality is necessary for liberalism to be a reality, and more significantly it is 
prepared to use the state to enforce this equality. Furthermore, this liberalism is concerned 
about the increase in social “atomizing” and “social selfishness” which it is held attends the 
modern market and consumer economy. In sum, this form of liberalism is attended by a 
“philosophy of expansive and activist government.”21  
It is the first form of liberalism that finds acceptance with the writers and readers of First 
Things, not least because, as McClay argues, this liberalism approaches “albeit in secular 
political terms, the Judeo-Christian understanding of the high dignity of the individual human 
person.”22 
The responses to McClay’s essay, in the same edition of First Things, took issue with some of 
his points but, nevertheless, agreed upon the basic premise, namely that in respect of the 
market the role of government should be limited. So it was that James Rogers wrote that 
“because of the Fall, it is best to limit the power of the state” for Christians should hold to a 
“libertarian minimalism.”23 
A few months later, Patrick Deneen took up the discussion in his essay ‘Unsustainable 
Liberalism’.24 For our purposes Deneen’s essay is the more interesting of those we have 
discussed. This is because Deneen allows that we need to recognise the relationship between 
‘progressivism’, which the magazine dislikes, and ‘economic liberalism’, which the magazine 
approves of. It is this relationship that is problematic, but Deneen holds that it can 
successfully be addressed - yet how? The fundamental problem is that economic liberalism 
places the autonomous individual at its centre and this means that it is corrosive of the family 
and in general things social. Indeed, it appears that it might also be responsible for 
“breakdowns in the market” as well.25 What is required is a “fundamental rethinking of how 
law and economics are understood and employed to undergird the liberal vision of society.”26 
Whatever this would entail it does not entail a “cessation of free markets” nor does it call for 
increased state power, rather does it call for a “greater local autonomy” and “local forms of 
government.”27 Why this should answer to the problem of the concept of the self that is at the 
heart of economic liberalism is not clear (or at least not to me it isn’t), unless Deneen means 
to suggest that smaller communities will necessarily inculcate a concept of self that will 
temper that predicated upon autonomy. Whether or not this is what Deneen is arguing for his 
basic premise is the same as that held by Neuhaus and First Things; that whatever the 
                                                          
21
 27. 
22
 29. 
23
 James Rogers ‘Sin’s Political Lessons’ First Things, May 2012 (37). Another respondent in the same edition was Yuval 
Levin ‘After Progressivism’ who argued that what was needed was a “serious revival” of interest in Edmund Burke – a not 
uncommon theme among neo-liberal conservatives. Levin contrasts Burke with those radicals who represent a “sharp break 
from nature and history” in respect of the “Western tradition” (35). In point of fact, Burke’s whole argument was one contra 
the Western tradition if by that we mean something older than John Locke and Hobbes. Burke opposed any appeal to what 
he called metaphysics championing instead what we would see as being nascent modern pragmatism. This was the essence 
of his argument against the likes of Rousseau and Tom Paine; they were beholden to metaphysics and not to worldly wise 
political pragmatism. 
24
 Patrick Deneen ‘Unsustainable Liberalism’ First Things, Aug./Sept., 2012. 
25
 Ibid p.30. 
26
 29. 
27
 30-31. 
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problems may be with economic liberalism, even when it becomes apparent that it has a 
strong relationship to cultural liberalism (that is, progressivism), the answer is not to be 
sought for in curbing the markets, or in a strong centralised government, or in an increase in 
state influence; rather, the answer seems to be for more freedom for the local market!28  
The general upshot of the discussion in First Things is that any problems today attendant 
upon global capitalism is not about economic liberalism per se but with cultural liberalism 
which is variously identified with ‘philosophical liberalism’ or ‘hyper-liberalism’ or simply 
‘progressivism’.29 How it is cultural liberalism has become identified with economic 
liberalism such that they seem to be fellow travellers, as it were, is certainly a problem, one 
that the magazine has set about attempting to answer. So far in the discussion the answers 
proffered carry the implicit and explicit assumption that cultural liberalism does not belong, 
properly so, to economic liberalism but is something of an aberration, something that is 
                                                          
28
 In an essay published in First Things June/July 2010 entitled ‘The Morality of Self-Interest’, David Goldman applies this 
thinking to American foreign policy. He styles his approach as ‘realism’ (don’t all political theorists?) by reason that it is an 
“Augustinian realism.” By which is meant that it is anti-statist and free market, and being so is very much like America. 
“States that suppress individual rights on behalf of some expression of the collective will fail...Those that support individual 
rights have some chance of succeeding.” Hence “to the extent that other nations share the American love for the sanctity of 
the individual, they are likely to succeed” (54). Of course, the issue is whether or not economic liberalism does, in fact, best 
serve individual rights for it clearly does not serve the rights of unborn individuals or those who, having escaped the 
strictures of the neo-colonialist Planned Parenthood and the reach of Melinda and Bill Gates, have been allowed to be 
conceived and come to term and been born into poorer climes where free-market trade deals have undermined traditional 
agricultural products (such as in Haiti and Mexico, among other less fortunate lands). See too Goldman’s article which he 
co-wrote with Reuven Brenner ‘The Keynes Conundrum’ in First Things, October 2010. The article is, as might be 
expected, opposed to Keynesian economics, the conclusion being that government bureaucracies are to blame for all manner 
of economic problems, whereas if we listened to entrepreneurs and speculators things would all go much better. David 
Goldman was at the time of writing these pieces a senior editor at First Things as well the head of fixed income research at 
the Bank of America. This information is on the official website of First Things where all of Goldman’s articles are listed, 
except, that is, for one, at least it was absent when I accessed it on 13/11/13. This was his ‘The Morality of Self-Interest’ 
which I think was a little bit intemperate and it might have been felt that it was best left forgotten. 
29
 In his reply and critique of Patrick Deneen’s article (see above) Robert Miller (‘Eudaimonia in America’ First Things, 
April 2013) makes the contrast in liberalisms to be between ‘philosophical liberalism’ (which is the bad kind) and 
‘pragmatic liberalism’ (which is the good kind). The latter is not doctrinaire and is, in fact, “generally indifferent to the 
moral perfection of its citizens” (29). This is the American form of liberalism and it is America’s greatness. Miller opened 
his essay thus: “America is under attack in the pages of First Things” (25), hence it is his intention to defend her against the 
likes of Deneen. Basic to Millar’s argument is that “Social pathologies do not result primarily from philosophical mistakes” 
(28). The argument is that Deneen and other like critics are wrong to critique the basic principles that inform American 
pluralism as these principles really have little to do with the moral problems in America today. A similar line of argument 
can be found in Paul Griffith’s response to Deneen’s essay (‘Public Life Without Political Theory’ First Things, Aug./Sept. 
2012). Griffith writes that what is needed is “data” (35-36) and “good statistical information” (36) not theory. “Reason is 
incapable (and unaware of its incapacity) of assessing the outcome of adjusting complex systems” (36). Daniel Mahoney in 
his response to Deneen’s essay (‘The Art of Liberty’ First Things, Aug./Sept. 2012) draws a distinction between 
‘philosophical liberalism’, which is of Hobbes and Locke and the concomitant notion of the autonomous individual, and the 
kind of liberalism proper to America which has to do with a “liberal republican order” (35), an order that is “federalist” in 
nature (34). What is needed is that Americans have a pride in this order: “Americans need pride, in themselves and in their 
tradition, a tradition that is not reducible to philosophical liberalism” (34). David Yeago (‘Modern But Not Liberal’, First 
Things June/July 2012) contrasts “ideological liberalism” (26) to the kind of theological liberalism that has arisen in 
Catholicism and Lutheranism. Ideological liberalism is defined by “individual autonomy and human rights” (27) as well as 
“individualistic voluntarism” (28). It is simplifying in a Hegelian like way (29) and does not recognise the “complexity and 
contingency” of the world in which we live (29). In a similar manner Thomas White (‘Love’s Greater Freedom’, First 
Things June/July 2012) contrasts what he calls “hyper-liberalism” which like all ideologies reduces “the human person...to 
some one principle” (35) and which thus ignores the complexity of what it is to be human (35), to a more moderate and 
Christian form of liberalism. Above all else, there does need to be a “normative account of the human good” for this 
provides a necessary tension to the autonomous choice of the individual (36). In these and other essays though the writers 
might differ one with the other in particulars, they nevertheless agree to distinguish between one form of liberalism, which is 
a bad form associated with cultural liberalism, and the good form which is, by and large, associated with economic 
liberalism and America properly understood. 
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probably the result of undue state interference in the market.30 Neuhaus and other writers may 
have posited a inextricably entwined relationship between a good form of liberalism (that 
identified with pluralism and the privileging of the individual over state and ‘ideological’ 
collectives) and a liberal economy, but this relationship has little if anything to do with 
cultural liberalism referred to as ‘progressivism’.31 
Both in Neuhaus’ book and the later essays in First Things the sense is that the free-market 
represents the economic system that best corresponds to ‘human flourishing’ and it does so 
by reason that it alone of all such systems best respects and nurtures the freedom of the 
individual as well as the ‘common good’.  
It might be said that the genius of this position is that it can, at one and the same time, style 
itself as being anti-utopian while insinuating that it alone is conducive to the perfection of 
human nature. The sense of ‘utopian’ in the discourse of Neuhaus and First Things tends to 
refer to those systems that claim to be able to change, shape, mould, or even perfect human 
nature. As a rule where a system is referred to as ‘utopian’ this implies government programs 
and a consequent interference in the market economy; in short, in the state imposing itself, 
illegitimately so, upon the freedom of the individual. But how is it that economic liberalism 
can be opposed to utopian claims concerning the perfecting of human nature and yet seem to 
be making similar claims itself? It does so by reason that in appearing to oppose state 
informed ideologies it gives the appearance of opposing positive prescription (which is to say 
laws) and thereby of promoting and preserving freedom. And, as freedom as understood by 
First Things is defined by reference to the individual, and as this freedom describes the 
proper and even perfect state of an individual, then economic liberalism not being a 
prescriptive doctrine but a permissive one is thus the system most conducive to the 
flourishing of human nature proper. It is not too difficult to see that at the heart of this matter 
lies the definition of ‘freedom’ and the relationship of freedom so defined to human nature, a 
topic that we will return to in the second part of this series. 
It ought also to be noted that recent discussions in First Things have not been as bold and 
forthright as Neuhaus was in his book discussed earlier. Neuhaus was not afraid in stating 
that his position was to be identified with capitalism; indeed the title of his book broadcast 
this point to all and sundry, Doing Well and Doing Good: The Challenge to the Christian 
                                                          
30
 A similar conundrum attends cultural liberals only they affect to reject any necessary link to economic liberalism, but they 
too are confronted by the fact that these two liberalisms have been, at the very least, fellow travellers. This is a topic to 
which we will return in the following essay. 
31
 The closest that a writer in First Things comes to seeing the inextricable link between cultural and economic liberalism is, 
to my mind, Edward Skidelsky’s essay ‘The Emancipation of Avarice’ (First Things, May 2011). Skidelsky argues that 
usury which is the basis of our commercial economy encourages avarice and greed as well as self-love. Furthermore it strips 
economic activity of its ethical character (37), all of which plays into the “familiar progressivist narrative” of 
consequentialism (that is, contra a theological understanding of natural law) (38). Certainly, Skidelsky hints that the bad 
aspects of a commercial economy can be put down to cultural liberalism (that is ‘progressivism) but he goes on to say 
something that did not sit well with the readers. He actually argued for “the power of the state” to “discourage avarice” (38-
39) which appeared to be an argument for state interference in the economy. The letters that followed, in First Things 
August/September 2011, were critical of this and other points, as one John Penfold wrote: “Markets fail, often spectacularly, 
but left alone they self-correct. The government does not,” this is because with government “rot and corruption become the 
norm” (8). All the replies defended capitalism and there was not one that said that perhaps Skidelsky was on to something or 
that he even had a point. I stress this was the case even though Skidelsky did not argue against liberal economics per se, and 
even took the standard line that the detrimental effects were down to ‘progressivism’ and not liberal economics per se. It was 
simply because, as far as I can see, that he did not argue for less state interference in the markets. 
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Capitalist. But that was in 1992 when capitalism could be triumphalist; whereas since the 
crashes and scandals of the late 1990s and on, well it is not too much an exaggeration to say 
that the term ‘capitalism’ has become a little odious. ‘Liberalism’ is a bit more acceptable 
except, of course, for the use made of it by those who are progressivists, hence the need, as 
we have seen above, for First Things to distinguish between different forms of liberalism. 
If we translate First Things more recent language into that of Neuhaus’ plain language then in 
light of what we have charted above we can say this: that capitalism is the most conducive 
economic system for the flourishing of human nature, which nature is exemplified in the 
individual and not in a collectivity; that as an economic system capitalism not only embodies 
the principle proper of human nature, namely freedom, it also fosters human nature and helps 
to perfect it; and that capitalism is, in essence, antithetical and antipathetic to state control, 
which is to say government interference, for state control fosters that which is inimical to 
human nature being inimical to freedom proper. If we take this seriously, which First Things 
wants us to, and if we consider it by way of Christian theology (more specifically Catholic 
and Thomist theology) then we would, I think, be justified in arguing that capitalism is one of 
the primary natural means by which God works to bring human nature to its proper end. It is 
no surprise, then, that Neuhaus first of all and then First Things should think it fit that those 
who count themselves orthodox Catholics (and orthodox Protestants and Jews) should defend 
and promote economic liberalism, a program that seems to have found its way to Australia, to 
Sydney in particular. And it is also no surprise that they should print articles (and books) to 
the effect that divine revelation points to something of a similar conclusion, which brings us 
to the last essay from First Things to be engaged with here: Yoram Hazony’s ‘The Biblical 
Case for Limited Government’.32 
Hazony’s analysis is confined to the Hebrew Bible (or Old Testament) and in particular to the 
historical books dealing with the kings of Israel (including Judah). His argument is that the 
Bible charts a middle course between anarchy (exemplified in the period of the Judges) and 
monarchical despotism. Although the problem of anarchy is mentioned, the accent in 
Hazony’s article is on the state and thus his conclusion is that the Hebrew Bible is 
“fundamentally suspicious of the state.”33 It is not too difficult to agree with Hazony’s 
conclusion, though in agreeing with it one would also want to point out that the Bible is 
fundamentally suspicious of all human concerns, including everything associated with 
individuals acting as individuals. Why Hazony should single out the state for special mention 
is not hard to guess given the sentiments of First Things. The fact that the Bible is suspicious 
of all human concerns this side of the Fall is not something in dispute, even the most 
thorough going Pelagian amongst us would allow that to be the case. The issue has to do with 
what form of government and economy is best suited to rein in, check, and ameliorate the 
effects of sin, while being conducive to the encouragement of virtue. And when the issue is 
put like this then something very important is seen to be missing from Hazony’s essay, 
something to which we will return shortly. 
                                                          
32
 Yoram Hazony ‘The Biblical Case for Limited Government’ First Things, October 2012. 
33
 Ibid p.42. 
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Hazony posits the best system of government as being one in which the state has a “dual 
legitimacy,”34 one part consists of social acclamation (a kind of social contract) and the other 
has to do with an “independent standard of right,” namely God.35 As most Christians would 
agree on this it might be thought trite, or more charitably of being the enunciation of a 
general principle which is to be filled out and given concrete content sometime in the future. 
Perhaps Hazony is even now following up on this. As the essay stands, however, the only 
concrete content that Hazony gives to his ‘dual legitimacy’ model is that it ought to be 
attended by limited government. The Bible, we are led to understand, sees limited 
government as the best form of government. Thus does Hazony’s essay lend biblical (and one 
presumes divine) legitimacy to the politics and economics championed by First Things.  
There is something of a cheap trick in scholarship that serves a form of one-upmanship, and 
this is especially evident in respect of reviews. The reviewer points out something the author 
has failed to mention thereby giving the impression that the reviewer knows just that little bit 
more about the subject than the author of the work being reviewed does. Given that no author 
can exhaust a subject there is always something a reviewer can find to put the author in their 
place. And yet, having said that there are nevertheless times when pointing out an absence is 
called for; when what is not included in the work under review is essential to the serious 
treatment of the topic in question. Often what is missing is very telling indeed in that what it 
tells of is blindness, only it is no ordinary blindness but might rather be described as being of 
the nature of ideological myopia. Whether or not this applies to Hazony’s essay others can 
decide, but whatever the case may be there is very serious and significant omission in his 
argument. ‘Significant’ not least because what is absent might be said to undermine his 
conclusion. 
What Hazony does not mention is that the Torah prescribes a centralised theocratic state, one 
in which the economy is reined in by laws that severely delimit the freedom of both capital 
and the market.  
The significance of this omission might be spelt out in this way: if the laws found in the 
Torah were applied today then our economy (we could say the global economy) would look 
very different to how it looks now. For example, if usury were outlawed, if all debts were 
wiped every seven years, if all land reverted back to the ownership of the original extended 
family every forty nine or fifty years, if it was incumbent upon those who are wealthy to help 
those in their extended family who are poor, and if no work whatsoever was allowed on the 
Sabbath, and if these and other like matters were to be enforced by the state then I think it 
reasonable to say that the shape of our society would be very different indeed.36 And by that I 
mean not just economically but politically and culturally different as well. And as Neuhaus 
allowed that the spiritual is a subset of the cultural, then our society would also look 
                                                          
34
 44. 
35
 46. 
36
 Against usury Exodus 22:25, Deuteronomy 23:19-20; the wiping of debts Deuteronomy 15:1-11; Jubilee year reversion of 
land Leviticus 25:10; helping the extended family Leviticus 25:35-37; and Sabbath Exodus 20:8; 23:12; 31:15. And this is 
not to mention enforced tithing to help the Levites but also the poor (for example Deuteronomy 26:12-15). I have used the 
term ‘extended family’ in the place of ‘kin’ and ‘tribe’ so as to employ a more modern idiom. The sense is of it being 
incumbent upon a person to look out for those even distantly related to them. Not just being incumbent by way of voluntary 
and virtuous behaviour, but being incumbent by way of state sanctioned and enforced law. 
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spiritually different to boot! Our consciousness would not be quite the same if only in respect 
of the way in which we understand value and meaning. 
Whether or not it would be a good thing that the aforementioned laws be put in place, or even 
if Israel ever in fact enacted these laws, is neither here nor there, at least in respect of the 
point we are making. The point being made here is that, pace Hazony and First Things, divine 
revelation certainly does give a mandate for state interference in the market economy. Indeed, 
it would seem to do so in a rather obvious way, by which I mean that it is not too difficult to 
see passages in the Torah (and the rest of the Hebrew Bible) that support a strong centralised 
government imposing itself upon the economy. Why, then, did Hazony and First Things (or 
at least the editors of First Things and their reviewers) not notice what appears to be a glaring 
omission? There is no evidence that would suggest insincerity or conscious duplicity on the 
part of Hazony or anyone else at First Things, and such a charge would not only be 
uncharitable but evidence as well of critical laziness. The argument here, and it is one to be 
taken up more so in the next essay in this series, is that what the foregoing testifies to is just 
how powerfully the economy can shape our consciousness, insofar as this is expressed in 
what it is that does and does not register in our reading of the sacred text (and for that matter 
any other text besides). 
Now, whatever else the aforementioned laws would have done they would, to a significant 
degree, have served to redistribute wealth. Taken together the laws cited earlier would have 
given rise to scenarios like the following: a wealthy person would have had to help out a 
poorer person (at the very least one in their extended family) and do so by way of a loan with 
no interest attached. And not only that, for if the loan were not able to be repaid it would in 
seven years be wiped from the ledger. (It might be argued that such a system would be open 
to abuse, or it might be that rich people would in such circumstances not lend any money, but 
if this were the case then such behaviour was not merely a matter of personal virtue but of 
state sanctioned, and presumably policed, law.) An interest free loan with no threat of it 
ending in financial servitude certainly seems to be one way in which wealth can be 
redistributed to those less fortunate. Indeed, it seems to something that might actually serve to 
encourage ‘small-business’ entrepreneurship, though of course it would certainly not 
encourage the kind of financial speculations that fuel today’s money markets, which in turn 
fuel modern capitalism.  
We might think this interference ill advised, or we might think that what the Bible mandates 
is more a matter of a general principles than specific rules to be applied in the same way in 
every situation - but whatever we think it is nevertheless true that if we look to the Hebrew 
Bible by way of guidance on matters political and economic it is not difficult to see that the 
Bible gives credence to a position that is contrary to the one that First Things champions. In 
short, there is little in the Torah that warrants the statement that divine revelation extols 
limited government interference in matters political and economic. 
As noted above, the issue here is why this aspect of biblical revelation is ignored, simply not 
seen, or not given due prominence in the thinking on matters political and economic in the 
pages of First Things. It might be argued that this is due to the Christian and Catholic 
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approach to the Old Testament, by which is meant that the economic laws in the Torah are 
irrelevant to the New Testament dispensation. But this is not the case for the simple reason 
that First Things is not given to dispensational exegesis or any form of exegesis that could be 
likened to supersessionism. It might be argued that although the laws of the Torah are not 
dispensed with in Christian polity they are transformed, in a similar way to how the purity 
and priestly laws are fulfilled and transformed in Christ. Certainly, this approach finds 
expression in some forms of Protestantism, notably ‘pietistic’ forms, where it is argued that 
the injunctions of the Torah are now no longer ones to be enforced by the state, rather have 
they become principles that the individual is ‘personally’ to ascribe to by way of a conscious 
and free decision. That is, the New Testament is a matter of the ‘heart’, by which is meant 
individual and free assent, whereas the Old Testament was a matter of state imposition. Such 
a simplistic view of biblical theology, however, seems out of place in First Things, and I can 
see in its pages no explicit argument made for this take on the Bible. And yet, in its 
championing of economic liberalism and the privileging of the individual over communal 
and/or state conceptions of the human person, First Things does seem to intimate such an 
understanding of the relationship of the Torah to Christian polity. This may be an unfair 
appraisal of First Things reading of the Bible, it may even be wrong, only be it wrong, right, 
or unfair, such explanations are called for in light of more recent discussions in the magazine 
on matters economic in relation to matters biblical. I want to pursue this matter some more in 
the next essay, but here we ought to turn to the New Testament in order to see what is made 
there of the economic laws in the Torah. Before we do this we might note a rather common 
phenomenon: when commentators treat of the way in which Jesus fulfils the Torah they 
rarely discuss the way in which he fulfils the economic laws in Torah. 
What we might begin by doing is observing something all Christians hold to, namely that 
Jesus did not come to abolish the Law and Prophets but to fulfil them37 and that the essence 
of the Law is to do to people what you would have them do to you.38 The latter being 
something that accords with what Jesus says are the two greatest laws: to love God with your 
whole heart and to love your neighbour as yourself.39 There is a hierarchical order to the laws 
by reference to which there is an order of derivation and orientation. In the Torah the 600 or 
so laws all find their proper meaning by reference to the highest laws, the love of God and 
love of neighbour. Informing this hierarchical system of derivation and orientation is a 
‘reciprocal’ logic, one in which our well-being (or to use the term First Things likes, 
‘flourishing’) is inextricably tied to the well-being or ‘common good’ of the other, which 
relationship is not something separate to, or distinct from, the state as covenantal community. 
Rather is the state/covenantal community both the chief expression of, and guarantor of, this 
relationship. It can be argued, then, that in the Torah the laws that rein in the economy are an 
essential element in protecting the common good of Israel and in allowing it to flourish. To 
put it another way, the economic laws are an essential aspect to preserving the reciprocal 
logic that informs the raison d’être of the Torah and, thereby, in preserving and nurturing the 
                                                          
37
 For example Matthew 5:17 and 7:12; Luke 16:17; 24:14. 
38
 Matt. 7:12. 
39
 Matt. 22:37; Mark 12:30; Luke 10:27. See Deuteronomy 6:4-5. 
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‘common good’ (and preserving and nurturing the ‘common good’ is a cause that First 
Things holds to be very much in its brief). 
How, then, are the economic laws fulfilled in Jesus? By which we do not mean how it is they 
are abolished, but how it is they find their perfect expression. First of all we might note that 
one aspect of this expression is that the laws and their logic of reciprocity are not annihilated 
but extended. Hence, although in the Torah usury between Israelites was forbidden it was not 
so between Israelite and Gentile.40 We would thus expect this law not be abolished but to be 
extended so as to include Gentiles as well, and that is what we find. 
Although we will be discussing the subject of usury and the Fathers in the second part of this 
series it is apposite here to quote St Augustine from his sermon on Matthew 19:21. This 
passage in Matthew is the well known one concerning the rich young man who says he keeps 
all the Law but is told by Jesus to give away all he has to the poor. Augustine paraphrases 
Jesus as saying both to the rich young man and to us that in selling all and giving the 
proceeds away to the poor we become a usurer in respect to God. “Give to God, and press 
God for payment. Yea, rather give to God, and you will be pressed to receive payment.”41 
Augustine notes that there are two forms of usury: worldly usury which is condemned and to 
be avoided; and usury towards God which is praised and to be encouraged.  
What Augustine picked up on is what we have, by and large, missed, though when it is 
pointed out it becomes as plain as day. In other words, something has blinded us to what is 
most evident. This is that contrary to common post-Reformation notions of grace the theme 
of reward bulks large in the topic of salvation in the New Testament, and no more so than in 
the Gospels. And this theme of reward is presented in economic terms, in terms of usury (or 
rather contrary to worldly usury), which is to say of reward on investment; you give to God 
and you receive back a hundredfold more. Again and again in the Gospels salvation is 
presented in, and illustrated by, economic terms, and this is more than mere metaphor for the 
contrast drawn is between the economics of heaven and the economics of the world, where it 
is expected that the former will supplant the latter.42 On a practical note it might be asked 
how it is we can lend to God? And the answer, as a rule, is by giving to the poor, that’s how.  
This is not, of course, a this-worldly prosperity doctrine such as one finds in certain forms of 
contemporary Pentecostalism, but it certainly is a soteriology of ‘investment’ insofar as in 
                                                          
40
 Deut. 23:20. 
41
 St Augustine Sermon 36, using R. MacMullen’s translation in The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Vol. 6. Grand Rapids, 
Eerdmans, 1979. See too St Augustine’s reflections on Psalm 37, in Volume 8. 
42
 For example see: Matthew 5:12, 42-48; 6:1-4, see too vs. 12 where we ask for the forgiveness of our debts as we forgive 
others their debts; 6:16-18; 10:40-42; Luke 6:20-23, 28-31, 35, 38; &:36-47; 8:18; 11:9-41; 12:33-34, 47-48; 14:12-14.  
See as well 16:1-8 and the parable of the shonky manager, the one who lessens the debts of his master’s clients, which 
parable ends in the statement that “You cannot serve God and Mammon.” Also Luke 16:19-31 on the rich man in hell who 
did not share of his wealth with Lazarus. We are told that he had his reward, the denouement of this tale being that the rich 
man expressed his (and apparently his brothers) deafness to the Law and the Prophets by his failure to obey the Law and 
help the poor. The investment the rich man made is contrasted to that which attended the state of Lazarus. As this follows on 
from our being told that the Pharisees “loved money” (Luke 16:14-15) then the story of the rich man in hell illustrates the 
outcome of that love. It is state of affairs later illustrated in the presence of the money changers in the Temple (19:45-46), 
and their devouring widow’s houses (20:47). There is one time honoured way in which the proverbial widow’s house is 
devoured and that, of course, is by way of usury. It is pertinent to note that these and other like passages in the Gospel often 
revolve around the way in which the Scriptures are read so as to ‘justify’ behaviours that are contrary to the Law. This is a 
theme to which we will return in the second part of this series. 
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redistributing ones wealth one gains greater treasures in heaven. This economics of 
soteriology is of grace, but not a grace that works principally to the individual as individual, 
but a grace that perfects the reciprocal logic enunciated in the Torah. It is a grace that works, 
first and foremost, through mediation, the mediation of the visible, authoritative, hierarchical 
covenantal communion. We are given grace in order to be a means of grace to others, and the 
principle way in which grace works is to build up the visible community which first and 
foremost applies to the Church43, but also to the state, not least, as St Paul put it, in its 
capacity to be a terror to evil doers and a source of consolation and protection for those who 
do good.44 Hence, God’s grace works both in the visible hierarchical order of the Church and 
likewise in the state, what’s more that which we have such that we can serve the other 
through the Church and the state comes from God; is of grace. In its supernatural and natural 
aspects grace works to establish and fulfil the two greatest laws of the Torah mentioned 
earlier, as well as the logic of reciprocity clearly enunciated in what is called ‘the golden 
rule’. Succinctly put, we are able to give by reason of the grace of God, and grace works to 
free our wills such that we can then cooperate with grace, and we cooperate with grace by 
‘investing’ the grace we have been given (which includes our wealth) with God by giving to 
those who are poor, and in doing this we are given an incredible return on our investment.45 
This is the heavenly economy, a heavenly usury, only when the attempt is made to justify 
worldly usury by reference to this economy then there can only be corruption; a corruption 
that thinks that it can serve both God and Mammon. It is in this confusion that ideological 
blindness finds its power. 
The passage from Matthew concerning the rich young man that St Augustine was 
commenting on is very significant in light of the above. If there is one thing that is made clear 
in the Gospels concerning Judah and its environs at the time of Christ it is that there was a 
large disparity between rich and poor, and concomitant with this there was a great amount of 
poverty and physical incapacity to be encountered on a daily basis. All of this was 
undoubtedly exacerbated by the great wealth on show in Jerusalem for such urban centres 
become a magnet to the impoverished and lame, the hope being that some of the wealth on 
show will, in today’s parlance, trickle down to them. Against this background it is interesting 
to reread the account of the rich young man. When the rich young man says he has kept all 
the commandments there is good reason to argue that this, in fact, is not the case, for he is 
still very rich while there are many poor and crippled people around him. We might ask of 
this young man, what of those laws in Torah that have economic ramifications? Not least 
those which command the helping the poor? That he couldn’t answer to Jesus’ demand 
expresses something of why he couldn’t answer to the Law’s command; he loved his wealth 
more than he loved salvation. But of course he would not have thought of it this way, he 
would have justified it, perhaps by doing the time honoured trick of seeing his wealth as 
being a sign of God’s blessing for his being pious. For our purposes we might put the issue in 
                                                          
43
 1 Corinthians 12:1-31. 
44
 Romans 13:1-7. 
45
 The Mass is the best example of this economy of grace. We give to God the gifts of the earth and of our hands (the bread 
and wine), gifts that come from God, and then these gifts are given to be the body and blood of our Lord who gives his life 
for us. We then eat these gifts that are made truly and really so into the body and blood of our Lord. Thus, from the gifts that 
God gives us, we give bread and wine to God, and then we get it back a ‘hundredfold’ greater than it was for now it is the 
gift to us of the body and blood of our Lord! 
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the form of a question: why was the young man unable to see those laws in the Torah that we 
touched upon earlier? Perhaps more startling still is that this blindness was one that Jesus’ 
disciples seemed to share for they are astonished by the outcome of this engagement.46 When 
Jesus says to the young man to give all that he has to the poor, Jesus may well be demanding 
more than the Law commanded but he is not annulling the law in question, rather is he 
extending it! He expands its scope.  
 “Love your enemies and do good to them; lend expecting nothing in return, and your reward 
will be great, and you will be sons of the Most High, for He is kind to the ungrateful and the 
selfish. Be merciful, even as your Father is merciful.”47 We might note that in this passage 
and others like it the reciprocal logic that informs the Law is made explicit, furthermore when 
Jesus says to lend and expect nothing in return, well that is what the Law commanded. The 
Law is fulfilled by being expanded such that it applies not only to a person’s extended family, 
or even to Israel, but to all people, hence the prohibition against usury applies not only to 
fellow Israelites but to the enemies of Israel as well, namely to the Gentiles, which is to say to 
the global economy. What Jesus does is show how the economy of salvation is one in which 
the worldly economy of usury is turned on its head (or to paraphrase Marx on Hegel, on its 
feet). The common good of humanity, which is to say the flourishing of humanity, requires 
the transformation of the worldly economy into one that is in accord with the economy of 
heaven and the state certainly has a role in this.  
Only it is just here that many baulk, and all of a sudden the extent and reach of the Gospel is 
said to have reached its limit; we might say that here is where its extension is stayed. And 
where exactly is the limit to the reach of the Gospel? It would seem at the very borders of an 
economy based upon worldly usury; which is to say exactly where capital is freed from moral 
constraints, at the place that today we call ‘the free-market’. The problem is, and it is the 
problem that First Things seems unable at the moment to seriously address, is that today 
society in all its aspects is increasingly defined by reference to the free market not least 
through the logic of commodification and privitisation (or more accurately ‘corporatisation’) 
and this has ramifications for all aspects of society and culture. The most obvious and yet 
routinely ignored example of this being the example which served to open our discussion 
proper, namely the commodification of human life and its subjugation to the logic of the 
consumer economy in abortion and its accoutrements.  
To translate this into the language First Things employs: the limit of the Gospel coincides 
with the limit to which the government can ‘interfere’ in the market. Both the Gospel and the 
government seem to reach an impasse as far as the market is concerned, for when we come to 
the market economic matters are now to be the concern of the individual’s free choice and not 
to be a subject proper of government interference be it by way of law or other form of 
agency. The problem is that when the market becomes off-limits it does not stay in its place, 
it expands its reach and, soon enough, all comes under its domain, insofar as all value and 
                                                          
46
 Note how in Matt. 19:25 the disciples are astonished to hear that rich people getting into heaven is an impossible thing to 
achieve. They reply “Who then can be saved?” The implication of their response is that any reasonable and pious Jew of the 
time would have thought that a very rich person who appeared to keep the Law in most particulars would be saved. To hear 
that this is not the case is astonishing.  
47
 Luke 6:35-36. This was one of, if not the, principle Scriptural passages used by the Fathers in their denunciation of usury. 
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meaning are determined by its logic. Like Marx, Neuhaus was right, and so too for that 
matter are Robert George and Paul Ryan, the economic, the political, and the cultural (which 
includes the spiritual) are all entwined, and so it should really occasion no surprise that it is 
abortion above all else that reveals the real causal relationship between economic liberalism 
and cultural liberalism. We will return to this subject in more depth in the next instalment. 
By way of wrapping this piece up we might note that there has been much debate in the 
Church since at least the Fathers on as to what constitutes usury proper: is it a blanket ban on 
making profit from investing money, or does it refer only to having money multiply by 
reference to no concrete external good? Is it a blanket ban on lending at interest, or does 
usury refer only to lending at interest to the poor? There are many other like questions raised 
in the course of the history of the Church and I want to return to the primary issue in the next 
essay – this being if the condemnation of usury was only a matter of justice in respect of 
contingent circumstances, or if it refers to matters of natural justice and thus has to do with 
metaphysics, which is to say with the very character and constitution of creation itself. 
Suffice it to say here that in the Church the discussion turned on the nature of usury proper, 
not if it should be proscribed by the state – the condemnation of usury was a given. It needs 
to be stressed that whatever usury was it was to be proscribed, and if that were not possible 
then hemmed in.  
The point here is that in both the Bible and the history of the Church (and this includes both 
Catholic and Protestant, at least in Protestantism’s early years) the issue of usury and the role 
of the state in delimiting or even proscribing it was certainly not seen as being evidence of 
the Church or state overreaching itself. Indeed, it was seen as the duty of the Church and/or 
state to oppose usury or severely delimit its application and that with heavy penalties 
enforceable by law. In other words, it was seen to be the duty of the Church and/or the state 
to interfere in the economy.  
It may well be that we now know better, that now we know that freeing up capital in the way 
we have done is a God mandated way of encouraging ‘human flourishing’ and thereby of 
aiding the ‘common good’. And it may also be the case that by reason that America has been 
the home both of the intellectual defence of the freeing up of capital and its application then 
America is to be defended by every Catholic and Christian who deserves to be called 
Christian and Catholic. What’s more, it may well the case that through exporting this 
economic model, such that it becomes applied throughout the global economy, that the world 
will become more liberal (in the non-pejorative sense of that term), more inclusive and more 
pluralistic, as well as more protective of individual human rights across the globe. All of this 
may well be the case (though I do not think so), but if it is so then we might have expected far 
better biblical exegesis from the pages of First Things, not to mention a far deeper 
engagement with the history of the Church on the issue of usury. In other words, we might 
have expected a few less blind spots. 
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